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"Art bids us touch and taste and hear and see the world, and shrinks from what Blake calls 
mathematic form, from every abstract thing, from all that is of the brain only, from all that is not 
a fountain jetting from the entire hopes, memories, and sensations of the body."i 
 
 
I.  Critique of "Body" 
 Western philosophy has long been dominated by a tradition of subjectivism that finds 
expresssion--'expression' is itself a sign of that tendency--in a whole vocabulary of mentalistic 
terms and their cognates, terms such as 'meaning,' 'feeling,' intention,' 'self,'  'consciousness,' 
and, of course, 'mind.'    For many, this tradition is the whole of philosophy.  It has become 
more rather than less widespread in philosophical practice as the material world--as this is 
understood by science, technology, and economics equally--has come to dominate social and 
political life.   
 This is not to dismiss such concepts and interests, for they represent many important 
issues that need to be considered.  I want, however, to challenge the larger context in which they 
occur.  It is my view that subjective or mentalistic presuppositions cannot help but deeply color 
both the direction and outcome of query.  Philosophical idealism has been a powerful force and 
it has dominated much of philosophy in the West, as well as in the East.  What is most important 
in philosophical inquiry, however, is to plant both our feet on foundation stones that rest on the 
firmest ground, that make the fewest assumptions, and that are embedded in the clearest and 
strongest evidence available.   
 A counter-tendency has arisen in our day, away from largely mentalistic philosophy and 
the powerful influence of subjectivistic doctrines, to philosophical discussion that gravitates 
toward its opposite pole.  Instead of being preoccupied with nuances of thought, meaning, 
feeling, and the intricate byways of consciousness, many philosophers now talk of body and, 
under the influence of Merleau-Ponty, of the flesh.  More recently, Wolfgang Welsch has found 
in our bodies a condition for every operation.  Philosophically the body acts as a 
counter-balance against the immaterial influences of the electronic media, and he cites Lyotard, 
Dreyfus, Virilio and Baudrillard, who find in the body a similar salubrious force.  But for 
Welsch the body is more than this.  Our bodies possess a certain sovereignty, an obstinacy in the 
face of the pervasive influences of the media.  They offer a point of stability against the subtle 
power over us of the electronic worlds.ii 
 This turn toward the body is welcome.  It works as a corrective to both philosophical and 
cultural immaterialism.   Perhaps it is part of the obsession of both our commercial culture and 
the counterculture with cultivating the body as an object, especially an erotic object.  From a 
philosophical perspective, a philosophy of the body may be a historical emergent, provoked by 
some of the social developments of our time-- post-modernism's challenge to the canon of 
received truths, feminism's confrontation with patriarchal power and the pieties that both mask 
and enforce that power, and the materialism both of scientific research and of culture.   
 
2 
 This focus on the body is a positive development.  "Body" draws our attention to things 
that have traditionally been overlooked in philosophy.  Yet to speak of 'body' is as one-sided as 
it is to speak of 'mind.'  What would we think of a journal called Body?  By the same token, 
what should we think of a journal called Mind, as if you could understand body without mind or 
mind without body?  Indeed, what are either of these but historically grounded fictional 
constructs that reflect and encourage conceptual divisiveness, a persistent Cartesianism that, in 
dividing the question, settles nothing but rather originates problems of its own.   
 I am afraid, however, that much of Western philosophy remains mired in the dualistic 
premises of seventeenth and eighteenth century science and that it has failed to reconstruct itself 
in the mode of twentieth century physics and biology.  Cartesian dualism is itself one of the 
consequences of idealism.  It flourishes everywhere, despite significant alternatives that have 
appeared over the past century and a half, from Marx to Merleau-Ponty to Justus Buchler and 
beyond.  Indeed, that recent intellectual oddity, the philosophy of mind, rests firmly on this 
idealistic tradition.   
 Can we even speak of either mind or body without the one entailing the other?iii  They 
are, at the very least, complementary terms.  What is meant, for example, by speaking of "my 
body?"   Who or what is this "my," the owner of this body?  And what is the difference 
between speaking of "my body" and speaking of "my hand," "my leg," "my head?"  Who is the 
"I" that is the personal referent in all of these instances, the "I" who possesses the arm, the foot, 
the body?   Is the owner of the arm or foot different from the owner of the body?   Perhaps 
'body' is less a material or ontological entity than what anthropologists call a folk category 
dressed up in academic robes, like many other philosophically sanctioned concepts.ivThe 
anthropological term 'folk category,' in spite of its potential significance, is little known in 
philosophical discourse.  It refers to the claim that every society operates with conceptual 
models.  "A society's culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to 
operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for any 
one of themselves....It is the forms of things that people have in mind, their models for 
perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them."  Ward H. Goodenough, "Cultural 
Anthropology and Linguistics," in Report of the 7th Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics 
and Language Study, Paul L. Garvin, ed.  Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics No. 
9, Institute of Languages and Linguistics, Georgetown University, Washington, pp. 167-168.  
Quoted in Robert A. Manners and David Kaplan, eds., Theory in Anthropology, A Sourcebook 
(Chicago:  Aldine, 1968), p. 476.  See also Ward H. Goodenough, Description and Comparison 
in Cultural Anthropology (Chicago:  Aldine, 1970), p. 104. 
 
II.  Some philosophical extensions of the traditional notion of body  
 In attempting to free ourselves from what may be false problems, it will help to consider 
some rather different extensions of the traditional notion of body as a material object.  The first 
of these is the Japanese philosopher Kitaro Nishida's concept of the historical body.  The use of 
tools under historical (i.e. cultural) conditions demonstrates the primary union of subject and 
object that is basic to Nishida's philosophy.  Techn , the act of making things with tools, does 
not confine itself to the subject.  It consists in penetrating into things, and in the function of 
things becoming ours.  "Taking tools in hand, the human being finds himself already in the 
world of historical life."v   As we make things with tools, we act in the historical world.  Action 
presupposes desire, which comes from our body, but at the same time is influenced by historical 
conditions.  Making things, then, is acting bodily, and this Nishida regards as a 
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subjective-objective historical fact.  "Our bodies are historical in two senses.  First, they 
intervene historically in the world, and make things; at the same time, they are historical because 
they are already formed through history."vi   
 Merleau-Ponty develops a similar reciprocity in exploring the subtle insinuation between 
seeing and the visible and between touching and the touched.vii  He finds in the reversibility of 
each of these pairs "the claim that the flesh of the world perceives itself though our flesh which 
is one with it."  In a telling metaphor, he calls the body "a charged field."viii  "Charged field" is a 
pregnant phrase.  It suggests energy that reaches out, not 'out,' for that implies its complement 
'in,' but rather it envisions the pervasiveness of energy.  The body is a concentration of forces 
that is part of a larger field.  In this reciprocity of perceiving-perceived, which Merleau-Ponty 
associates with Einfühlung, we are in the object we are describing, we are of it.  "My body is 
made of the same flesh as the world...."ix  Yet at the same time as he asserts a continuity between 
my flesh and the flesh of the world, he reverts to subjectivism when he takes the body as the 
Nullpunkt, the point from which the world is measured.x"Flesh of the world, described (apropos 
of time, space, movement) as segregation, dimensionality, continuation, latency, 
encroachment--Then interrogate once again these phenomena-questions:  they refer us to the 
perceiving-perceived Einfühlung, for they mean that we are already in the being thus described, 
that we are of it, that between it and us there is Einfühlung.  That means that my body is made 
of the same flesh as the world (it is a perceived), and moreover that this flesh of my body is 
shared by the world, the world reflects it, encroaches upon it and it encroaches upon the world 
(the felt senti at the same time the culmination of subjectivity and the culmination of materiality), 
they are in a relation of transgression or of overlapping--This also means:  my body is not only 
one perceived/among others, it is the measurant (measurant) of all, Nullpunkt of all the 
dimensions of the world."*  The touching itself, seeing itself of the body is itself to be 
understood in terms of what we said of the seeing and the visible, the touching and the touchable.    
I.e. it is not an act, it is a being at (tre ).  To touch oneself, to see oneself, accordingly, is not to 
apprehend oneself as an ob-ject, it is to be open to oneself, destined to oneself (narcissism)...."*  
The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 248-249.   
 Then there are the ways in which the body speaks to things and things speak to the body.  
Some writers refer to bodily intentionality, found not only through movement but from the 
thought of movement, as well.xi  The notion of bodily intentionality nicely fuses thought, action, 
and object.  Coming at this mutual magnetism of body, thought, and object, the psychologist J. 
J. Gibson speaks of the "affordances" of things for behavior.  "To perceive is to be aware of the 
surfaces of the environment and of oneself in it.  The interchange between hidden and unhidden 
surfaces is essential to this awareness."xii    
 
III.  Body and environment 
 The idea of environment perhaps most fully encompasses the rich contextual field of 
human experience.  Not only does the concept of body need to be reconfigured; its very 
boundaries must be redrawn.  Our concept of body is changing, and we can no longer easily 
demarcate its borders.  Biological ecology has grown into cultural ecology, as we continue to 
enlarge the complex interlocking dimensions of the human context.  Environment embraces the 
recognition that body is contextual still more-- organically, conceptually, and ontologically.  Not 
only is body known in its setting but it finds its existence, its meaning, and its being in and 
through its context.  No body stands alone. 
 Most important for humans is the cultural environment.  Awareness is growing of the 
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fact that no body exists without culture, and that culture shapes the body in specific ways.  
Moreover, we cannot speak of the body as such but only of particular bodies that constitute 
different ways of being in the world--in different physical environments, in different social 
environments, and in different historical cultures.  The cultural environment profoundly 
influences body size, facial expression, deportment, and movement--such as a person's walk--and 
profoundly affects such features as hair style and dress.  Dress, for example, is not just the 
body's image but a part of body, not its external skin, but the outermost layer of all that lies 
beneath it--size, height, bulk, feelings, and ideas about one's bodily self.  Food is a central part 
of psycho-social life, an active synthesis of body, belief, feeling, and attitude.  Grasping the idea 
that body is environmental, then, sets us in a different direction.  It takes the body as thoroughly 
contextual.xiii 
 With all this, what can we make of an aesthetics of the body?  If we cannot speak of the 
body as such, what then can we say about an aesthetics of the body?  To say that beauty can be 
located in the body is no less absurd than to pontificate that it lies in the beholder's mind.  Is 
there a non-dualistic alternative?  Can there be an aesthetics of the person?  That may be a more 
interesting question.  Perhaps in exploring the engagement of the whole person in the world we 
can begin to illuminate an integrated, holistic human aesthetic.  In the discussion that follows, 
reference to 'body' is entirely metaphorical.  More specifically, 'body' is used synecdochically, 
as a part that is indissolubly bound to an integral whole, the human person. 
 One way to speak of the body from this environmental standpoint is to forego the word  
'body' altogether and talk only of  'embodiment.'   'Embodiment' is preferable to 'body' because 
it incorporates, literally "brings the body into," the context of his or her cultural, social, 
historical, and personal experience, experience that holds as many dimensions of consciousness 
as it does of materiality. 
 
IV.  Music as Embodied 
 Let me give this general picture a particular setting, an artistic one.  When I experience 
any art appreciatively, what occurs is no wholly personal, subjective, unique, and esoteric event 
but a fulfillment of the rich and complex capacities I possess as a human person situated at a 
particular time, place, and circumstance.  In this sense all art is situated and embodied as a 
transactional process involving the whole person.   
 To think of art, however, as an object--a painting, a piece of music, a poem--fragments 
what is an integral process.  From whatever place in the aesthetic field we start, whether it be 
the artist, object, appreciator, or performer, the other factors have a quiet presence.  Thus the 
active, physical process of producing the living art is embedded in the work and the traces of that 
activity become part of the experience of appreciation.  The brush strokes in a painting are not 
merely surface irregularities but the markings of the brush, the hand that held it, and the artist 
with whom these were conjoined.  Color tonalities are not just surface qualities but were chosen, 
just as Fry pointed out that a line is the record of a gesture.  In a similar way, musical sounds are 
more than auditory sensations; they are produced in some way, executed by the bow of a stringed 
instrument, a person's breath into a woodwind or brass instrument, the movement of fingers on 
piano keys, or hands and feet on the organ.  The singing voice belongs to a person and a social 
presence underlies call-and-response singing and work songs, just as spatial distance is inherent 
in the sound of antiphonal music.   
 Dance quite literally embodies music.  Most dance is done to music or other sound, 
perhaps in part a consequence of its somatic effects.  Ethnic dancing, for example, is inseparable 
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from cultural styles in music and musical instruments.  National dance traditions in Europe, 
such as the Balkan, Scandinavian, Turkish, and English, are distinctive and strikingly different 
from one another.  The same can be said of African, Asian, and Native American dancing.  
Even when diverse traditions are combined, as in candomblé, a syncretic ecstatic religion in 
Brazil, the music, chanting, and dance become yet another singular amalgam.xiv  In the West, 
music written to be danced to, from the minuet to the waltz to disco, may find its way into other 
musical traditions, from Bach's instrumental and orchestral suites to Bartók's "Dance Suite."   
Lastly, music not written for dancing may be translated into bodily movement, as in Balanchine's 
"Double Concerto" to Bach's Concerto for Two Violins and his "Symphonie Concertante" to 
Mozart's work of the same name for violin and viola.  Even "quiet" listening engages the body 
subliminally.  These are only some of the many ways in which our bodies engage in the practice 
of music. 
 But music in dance not only enters and activates our bodies.  Its range is more diffuse 
still, spreading out to engulf the space in which it occurs.  We can think of the space defined by 
the dominating presence of sound as "sound space."  Musical listening thus is bodily 
engagement with sound in a setting.  What we have in embodied music, then, is actually 
environmental:  body-sound-space. 
 Music does not exist unless it is embodied.  The ear is always involved:  the ear of the 
listener guided by the ear of the performer which, in turn, is guided by the ear of the composer, 
much as, in painting, the eye of the artist is invariably present in the painting.  Because music  
always occurs as an event and usually first as a performance, bodily involvement is necessary.  
Even in electronic music, the composer actively fashions the sounds in a way comparable to a 
performer in a recording session.  Further, the actual performance of music demands far more 
than fingers, arms, lips, or tongue:   Playing an instrument engages the entire body.  One feels 
the sound entering one's body; we can  feel the sound vibrations going through to the feet.  
Madeline Bruser emphasizes that the performer "become(s) saturated with [the vibrations], 
achieving direct contact with the living texture of music.  The mind of the composer lives in [the 
performer's] body."xv  (Shades of dualism!)  Sudnow's account of Jimmy Rowles's jazz piano 
playing bears this out:  "I watched him..move from chord to chord with a broadly swaying 
participation of his shoulders and entire torso, watched him delineate waves of movement, some 
broadly encircling, other subdividing the broadly undulating strokes with finer rotational 
movements, so that as his arm reached out to get from one chord to another it was as if some spot 
on his back, for example, circumscribed a small circle at the same time...."xvi  The pianist and 
scholar Charles Rosen writes of how the entire body of the pianist engages in producing every 
crescendo and decrescendo.  The very physical instrument exerts an attraction on the pianist, 
who feels a physical need for contact with the keyboard.  Moreover, the sonorities and other 
traits of the instrument influence and affect the composer and the listener, as well.xvii  Our 
auditory imagination becomes actively involved, supplementing the decaying sound of a piano 
tone, contributing to the sounds that are actually heard, and hearing the inaudible by sometimes 
supplying notes that are unheard.  In his late writings, Barthes speaks of the listener as a reader 
performing the music, indeed, composing it a second time.   Rosen makes a similar point:  
"The listener must constantly alter, purify, and supplement what he hears in the interests of 
musical intelligibility and expressiveness, taking his cue from what is implied by the 
performer."xviiip. 3.  Rosen demonstrates this by analyzing examples from Beethoven and 
Schumann.  
Also, "The romantic 'heart,' an excorated metaphor, is a powerful organ, extreme point of the 
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interior body where, simultaneously and as though contradictorily, desire and tenderness, the 
claims of love and the summons of pleasure, violently merge:  something raises my body, swells 
it, stretches it, bears it to the verge of explosion, and immediately, mysteriously, depresses it, 
eweakens it.  This movement must be perceived _beneath_ the melodic line; this line is pure 
and, even at the climax of melancholy, always utters the euphoria of the unified body; but it is 
caught up in a phonic volume which often complicates and contradicts it...." Roland Barthes, 
"The Romantic Song," in The Responsibility of Forms (New York:  Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 
289.   In a live performance, the body is engaged with focused intensity.   
 The Western obsession with objects--objects that subjects use, control, or 
possess--extends to art.  We easily identify art with visual objects such as paintings and 
sculptures, and with literary ones such as novels and poems.  Doing this in the performing arts 
may seem somewhat more difficult but it does not deter the theoretical imagination.  Thus dance 
becomes ballets, and theater, plays.  Locating the musical object may seem more awkward still.  
The problem seems to fascinate some philosophers but does not deter audiences, who find it 
entertaining to focus their attention on the gyrations of conductors and the gestures of soloists.  
The object-centered focus of art has a powerful grip on our understanding and an exclusive hold 
on our attention.   
 I have tried to show that such a focus is partial and quite misleading.  Argument may not 
be powerful enough to dislodge the rigid grip of convention.  I should like to turn, therefore, to 
two examples, a literary one that both states the multi-dimensional character of music directly 
and exemplifies it in practice, and a musical one that exemplifies musical embodiment on many 
levels and with unusual richness. 
 
V.  Wallace Stevens, "Peter Quince at the Clavier " 
 Wallace Stevens was a major American poet of the mid-twentieth century.  His poems 
are subtle joinings of  an unusual poetic sensibility with a powerful intelligence that extend to 
embrace a metaphysical domain.   Stevens exhibits these characteristics through the musical 
theme of "Peter Quince at the Clavier."  The poem shifts constantly in denotation and metaphor 
from spirit to body to flesh.  At first this might seem to be inadvertent ambiguity or abject 
confusion.  That, I believe, is quite mistaken.  The poem embodies not confusion but rather a 
fusion, the deliberate recognition of their continuity and inseparability:  Music as heard, felt, and 
then remembered joins spirit and body in an indissoluble unity. 
 Analyzing the poem from this standpoint shows that fusion clearly.  The terms in bold 
face denote references to music, the terms underscored are references to the body, and those in 
italics may be understood as manifestations of consciousness.  Here poetry synthesizes with 




       Peter Quince at the Clavier 
  I 
Just as my fingers on these keys 
Make music, so the selfsame sounds 
On my spirit make a music, too.   
Music is feeling, then, not sound; 
And thus it is that what I feel, 




Thinking of  your blue-shadowed silk, 
Is music.  It is like the strain 
Waked in the elders by Susanna. 
 
Of a green evening, clear and warm, 
She bathed in her still garden, while 
The red-eyed elders watching, felt 
The basses of their beings throb 
In witching chords, and their thin blood 
Pulse pizzicati of Hosanna. 
 
  II 
In the green water, clear and warm, 
Susanna lay. 
She searched 
The touch of springs, 
And found  
Concealed imaginings. 
She sighed, 
For so much melody. 
 
Upon the bank, she stood 
In the cool 
Of spent emotions. 
She felt, among the leaves, 
The dew 
Of old devotions. 
 
She walked upon the grass, 
Still quavering. 
The winds were like her maids, 
On timid feet, 




A breath upon her hand 
Muted the night. 
She turned-- 
A cymbal crashed, 
And roaring horns. 
 
 III 
Soon, with a noise like tambourines, 
Came her attendant Byzantines. 
 
They wondered why Susanna cried 
Against the elders by her side; 
 
And as they whispered, the refrain 
Was like a willow swept by rain. 
 
Anon, their lamps' uplifted flame 
Revealed Susanna and her shame. 
 
And then, the simpering Byzantines 
Fled, with a noise like tambourines. 
 
       IV 
Beauty is momentary in the mind-- 
The fitful tracing of a portal; 
But in the flesh it is immortal. 
 
The body dies; the body's beauty lives. 
So evenings die, in their green going, 
A wave, interminably flowing. 
So gardens die, their meek breath scenting 
The cowl of winter, done repenting. 
So maidens die, to the auroral 
Celebration of a maiden's choral. 
 
Susanna's music touched the bawdy strings 
Of those white elders; but escaping, 
Left only Death's ironic scraping. 
Now, in its immortality, it plays 
On the clear viol of her memory, 



















VI.  Debussy's "La Cathédrale engloutie"  
 
 Stevens's musical trope displays body and consciousness as an unbroken whole.  It is a 
brilliant recognition of the remarkable force with which music is able to engage us as integral 
human beings.  What this poem of music exhibits in the evocative medium of language, music, 
itself, does directly and immediately.  Although I believe this is true of all music, irrespective of 
genre, a particularly eloquent illustration of the rich complexity of musical embodiment, joining 
together many facets of human being in a seamless flow of sound, is Claude Debussy's Prelude 
No. X for piano called retrospectively, "La Cathédrale engloutie" or "The Sunken Cathedral."   
 For the sake of clarity, I have grouped my comments on this work around several 
different centers:  cultural association, sound, performance, and musical knowledge, although in 
the live act of listening they are fused together.  Cultural association begins the discussion 
because, in this particular piece, it pervades many of the other factors.  While it comes first here, 
in the performance of the piece it is actually last, for the title of the prelude, explicitly relating 
the piano's chords to the muffled bells of a cathedral, appears at the end of the printed score 
rather than at the beginning.  The explanation usually given is that Debussy did not want the 
audience to listen to the music as an illustration of the scene but rather to grasp it directly by ear.  
It is interesting that, in describing how this occurs, we are led to make use of bodily referents and 
metaphors. 
 Certain sounds are characteristic of impressionist music, a stylistic movement centered in 
France at the end of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth.  Among them 
are the whole tone scale and parallel chords, which include parallel fifths, something carefully 
avoided in earlier periods.  These sounds are especially pronounced in the music of Debussy and 
nowhere more so than in this prelude.   Debussy builds the piece on octaves, on fifths, on 
fourths, their inversion, and on seconds and sixths, which result from the superposition of fifths.  
Combining these intervals produces harmonic sequences that are distinctively impressionistic.  
At the same time they recall the early development in Western ecclesiastical music known as 
organum (ca. 800-1250), which moved away from monody and toward harmony by adding 
parallel octaves and fifths.        . 
 Octaves, fifths, and fourths, moreover, are the pitches most pronounced in the overtone 
series.  Indeed, the first fifteen bars of this prelude are built entirely on the first three overtones,  
sounds that lie above the fundamental or principal note but are much weaker.  the octave, fifth, 
and fourth [e.g. G, g, d, g¹].    Most of us are oblivious of these faint pitches, but we do hear the 
richness and resonance they contribute to the note that is directly sounded.  These tones are 
especially pronounced in church bells, whose distinctive ringing reverberation comes from the 
unusually powerful overtones that are produced when a bell is struck forcefully.  Joining the 
hollow resonance of these harmonic structures with melodic materials that make extensive use of 
octaves, fifths, fourths, seconds, and sixths, intervals commonly found where multiple bells are 
used, vividly evokes the distinctive sound of cathedral bells.   
 Still another, subtle evocation of a cathedral has its basis in memory.  Many short 
phrases are repeated exactly or approximately, and there are several phrases that are 
symmetrical, like a palindrome that reads the same backward as it does forward.  (In music 
theory this is called cancrizans or crab.)  These have the effect of a kind of echo that, together 
with the impressionistic use of the damper pedal, which allows successive chords to run together, 
help create the auditory atmosphere of a cathedral's great resonating space. 
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 Most directly apparent of all is the way in which the body enters into the performance of 
this and any musical work.  Not only the hands but the torso, the legs, and feet are involved.  
The performer feels the physical vibrations of the sound from direct contact with the instrument 
as well as through the ears, and of course is deeply absorbed in listening as part of the process of 
guiding the body in producing these sounds on the piano.  The sounds spread throughout the 
space that embraces the pianist and the piano, and engulf the audience in a continuity of space, 
sound, and bodily presence. 
 Knowledge is probably the most variable of the factors in musical experience because its 
influence results not only from the cultural conditioning of the participant, whether performer or 
listener, but also from the education, training, past exposure, and other such differences in 
personal history.  Yet knowledge is nonetheless a forceful influence.  It functions as a filter 
through which our perception and engagement in the entire musical situation take place.  Not 
just national traditions but historical styles of composition, performance, and appreciation affect 
the experience of music, and all of these may be mediated by cognitive structures. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 The experience of music offers powerful proof of the embeddedness of human being.  It 
is environmental engagement at its highest pitch, and thus offers an eloquent argument for the 
full fusion of human being, a kind of reasoning I call the argument from experience.  When 
Walter Pater observed that "All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music,"xix he may 
have been extolling music at the expense of the other arts.   But perhaps he recognized that 
music achieves human embodiment with unusual forcefulness, directness, and immediacy.  Yet 
every art, or rather, every appreciative engagement with art, does something of the same thing, 
each in its own way.  Art thus offers us what philosophy has no language to express directly:  
the unity of human being and the continuity of our multiple dimensions.  By making this 
aesthetic fusion explicit in aesthetic experience, we can begin to reveal art's ways, perhaps the 
closest we can come to expressing the unsayable.xx 
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historical fact.  That we act presupposes that we desire.  From where does a desire come?  A 
desire...but be aroused from the bosom of our body.  So the body must be formed historically 
too.  We should notice that the body is not a simple biological body:  the human body must be a 
historical body."  Sasaki, p. 38 (Collected Works, vol. 8, p. 344-5). 
vii  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston:  Northwestern University 
Press, 1968).  See esp. pp. 142, 272.  See also Inari Arjas, Poetics of the Substantial:  
Transcendence in the Context of Environmental Aesthetics (unpublished thesis, Department of 
Literature, Theater, and Aesthetics, University of Helsinki, 1998), pp. 26, 29. 
viii  Merleau-Ponty, p. 267. 
ix    "It is by the flesh of the world that in the last analysis one can understand the lived body 
(corps propre)--The flesh of the world is of the Being-seen, i.e. is a Being that is eminently 
percipi, and it is by it that we can understand the percipere:  this perceived that we call my body 
applying itself to the rest of the perceived, i.e. treating itself as a perceived by itself and hence as 
a perceiving, all this is finally possible and means something only because there is Being, not 
Being in itself,/identical to itself, in the night, but the Being that also contains its negation, its 
percipi...."  The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 250-51.   
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x  I have indicated this with asterisks in the following passage: 
 
xi  See Inari Arjas,  Poetics of the Substantial:  Transcendence in the Context of Environmental 
Aesthetics (unpublished thesis, Department of Literature, Theater, and Aesthetics, University of 
Helsinki, 1998), p. 26. 
xii   J.J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 
1979), p.255. 
xiii  One can identify a series of body-environment connections, from the body in (the) 
environment to the bodily environment, the environmental body, body-environment, and, finally, 
the human environment (as bodily). 
xiv  Candomblé is strongly African, especially influenced by the Yoruba, but joined with Native 
American, and European elements.   In this religion the members seek spirit possession by their 
gods through chanting and drumming. 
xv  "Hearing does not stop inside your ears; it takes place in the whole body.  Even deaf people 
can dance to music because they feel the vibrations in their bodies."  Madeline Bruser, The Art 
of Practicing (New York:  Bell Tower, 1997), p. 171.  See also Chs. 6, 10, 12, and passim. 
xvi  David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand:  The Organization of Improvised Conduct (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 82.  See also pp. 83, 146, and passim. 
xvii  Charles Rosen, "On Playing the Piano," The New York Review of Books, October 21, 1999, 
pp. 49-52, 54. 
xviii  Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1995),  
 
xix  Walter Pater (1839–94), English essayist, critic. Studies in the History of the Renaissance, 
“The School of Giorgione” (1873). 
xx  I have explored the notions of aesthetic engagement and fusion in many different contexts 
and directions.  These appear in The Aesthetic Field:  A Phenomenology of Aesthetic 
Experience (Springfield, Ill.:  C. C. Thomas l970), Art and Engagement (Philadelphia:  Temple 
University Press, 1991), The Aesthetics of Environment (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 
1992), and Living in the Landscape:  Toward an Aesthetics of Environment (Lawrence:  
University Press of Kansas, 1997), and many recent papers. 
